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One could not pertinently speak about the recent experience of multi-partyism
in Africa without acknowledging the ‘teleological meta-narratives’ of de-
mocracy. That is, a system of knowledge and a series of discourses, theories
and ideologies that were constructed around the very idea of political liber-
alization, and that helped to frame its principles, as well as to orientate its
form, expression, mode of functioning and representation. But whatever their
orientations, assumptions or theoretical oppositions, all these savoirs shared
the same messianic approach to democracy and the same uni-linear evolu-
tionist vision about the social and political adjustment which many African
countries were going through in the early 1990s. Indeed, political liberali-
zation, as envisaged by both developmentalist and modernist philosophies,
assumed not only the universal principle of elective representation, good
governance, freedom, fair competition and alternation, but also embraced
the enlightenment ideals of emancipation, progress, change and betterment.
In this contribution, which does not claim to assess the experience of
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, we want to examine how these grand
narratives have affected Africans’ imaginations and the way they represent
multi-party politics, and how, as a result of these millenarian ideologies,
many of them have transformed the political adjustment into a sort of my-
thology of redemption. However, what is much more important to us is to
demonstrate that modernist (developmentalist and evolutionist) formula-
tions of the democratization process of the early 1990s, as a simple replica-
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tion of western modernity, have failed to take up the conceptual and meth-
odological challenges which these theories encountered when they travelled
from the West to sub-Saharan Africa.
Résumé
On ne saurait parler avec pertinence de l’expérience récente du multipartisme
en Afrique sans reconnaitre les « métarécits téléologiques » de la démocratie.
Il s’agit d’un système de connaissances et d’une série de discours, de théories
et d’idéologies qui ont été construits autour de l’idée même de la libéralisation
politique, et qui ont permis de formuler ses principes et d’orienter sa forme,
son expression, son mode de fonctionnement et de représentation. Mais quelles
que soient leurs orientations, leurs hypothèses ou leurs oppositions théoriques,
tous ces savoirs partageaient la même approche messianique de la démocratie
et la même vision unilinéaire évolutionniste sur l’ajustement social et politique
que de nombreux pays africains subissaient au début des années 1990. En
effet, la libéralisation politique, comme envisagée par les philosophies
développementaliste et moderniste, a non seulement adopté le principe
universel de la représentation élective, de la bonne gouvernance, de la liberté,
de la concurrence loyale et de l’alternance, mais a aussi épousé les idéaux
d’émancipation, de progrès, de changement et d’amélioration du siècle des
lumières.
Dans cette contribution, qui n’a pas la prétention d’évaluer l’expérience
de la démocratie en Afrique sub-saharienne, nous voulons examiner com-
ment ces grands récits ont affecté les imaginations des Africains et la façon
dont ils représentent les politiques multipartites, et comment, du fait de ces
idéologies millénaristes, nombre d’entre eux ont transformé la politique
d’ajustement en une sorte de mythologie de la rédemption. Cependant, ce
qui est beaucoup plus important pour nous, c’est de démontrer que les for-
mulations modernistes (développementaliste et évolutionniste) du proces-
sus de démocratisation du début des années 1990 comme une simple repro-
duction de la modernité occidentale n’ont pas réussi à relever les défis
conceptuel et méthodologique auxquels ces théories ont été confrontés quand
elles ont voyagé de l’Occident vers l’Afrique sub-saharienne.
Introduction
In November 2003, I attended a political rally organized at the Douala
Reunification stadium by two main opposition parties in Cameroon (the
Social Democratic Front and Cameroon Democratic Union). The objec-
tive of the meeting was to explain to their supporters their recent alli-
ance in preparation for the presidential election which was then scheduled
to be held on 11 October 2004. Before a meagre crowd who seemingly
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was much more interested in the performance of nearly denuded young
female dancers who were spinning their backsides and wriggling their
hips to the rhythm of Makossa and Mdombolo, the Chairman of the
Social Democratic Front (the main opposition party in Cameroon) ex-
pressed his disappointment about people’s loss of interest in politics.
He was particularly concerned with what he called ‘Cameroonians’ in-
difference and insensibility to the desperate condition the ruling CPDM
(Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement) regime has plunged many
of them into.’ Commenting on this failure of the opposition coalition to
win popular support to its cause, the editor of the newspaper Le Messager
observed that many Douala city dwellers preferred to attend to their
daily business rather than waste their time listening to politicians who
had got them used to their double-speech and ‘compromise of principle’
(compromissions).1 This setback was reminiscent of a flop experienced in
March 2003 by the Togolese opposition, which failed to mobilize its
sympathizers for a general strike. Its call for a civil disobedience fol-
lowed the decision of the Parliament to concede to the nearly 40 year-
ruling President (Gnasimbé Eyadema) the right to stay à vie in power, or
at least to die in power,2 as many of his Cameroonian, Gabonese,
Burkinabe, Zimbabwean, Equatorial Guinean, Chadian, Guinean, Con-
golese, Libyan, Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts also wish. Undoubt-
edly, very few people were willing to take to the streets to challenge the
man whom Togolese derisively called ‘the Bull of Kara’ (Taureau de Kara)
and his horde of ‘bleeders’ (saigneurs).3
These two examples are far from being isolated cases. If one acknowl-
edges the present general disaffection of the large majority of Africans
with politics, as many have been disappointed with the mythology of
democracy (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Hermet 1998; Jaffrelot 2000;
Njamnjoh 2000:1-44), they constitute a typical case for any study of the
experience of the democratization process in contemporary Africa. In-
deed, when we observe today the political landscape in most African
countries, there is one truth that emerges as the most memorable of any
acknowledgment one can make, whether about the esprit militant of Af-
ricans4 or about their relationship with their political elites: the days are
gone when thousands of people willingly crammed into the football sta-
diums or the main squares of the towns just to listen to the flights of
fancy of the opposition leaders, and their usual recriminations against
those in power they generally described as tyrants and kleptomaniacs.
We have to admit that we are also now far away from the golden time of
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the democratization process of the early 1990s when a determined crowd
of young ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘combatants’ could defiantly take to the
streets and ask for the organization of a Sovereign National Confer-
ence, a sort of popular tribunal where the despots and their cliques would
be judged for their crimes. The former heroes have become the true
‘zeros,’ or are fatigués, as one Cameroonian newspaper derisively put it.5
The rebirth of the multi-party system in many African countries in
the early 1990s, or what came to be known as the democratization proc-
ess, was of particular interest to policy makers, politicians, subaltern
groups, and especially social thinkers. For the former, the demand for
democracy or ‘authoritarian decompression’ (Bayart 1993) corresponded
with the pervasive developmentalist ideology of the late 1980s, and the
insidious policy of guardianship and supervision of the black continent
by ‘experts’ of the IMF and World Bank.6 Indeed, the ideal of democ-
racy and good governance, as forecast by some gurus and apostles of
neo-liberal policy was considered a panacea that supposedly had the
magical power of turning the highly indebted poor African countries into
newly-developed countries like the six dragons of South-eastern Asia or
would at least help ill-governed African states and their despotic rulers
achieve what O’ Donnell and Schnitter (1999) call ‘transitions from
authoritarian rule’. That is why for lack of being what Hermet (1998)
has called ‘democrats by conviction,’ African obscure despots, then in
power, were forced to be or become ‘democrats by convenience.’ Had
they any choice, since access by their impoverished and cash-strapped
countries to foreign aid was conditional on their adoption of the newly
fashionable notions of liberalization, democracy, good governance, and
structural adjustment?
For political elites, notably the ruling classes, this new mode of
governmentality called ‘democracy’ was seen as an opportunity to formu-
late new strategies of domination and accumulation, or simply to re-
structure old formulas of authority built on other foundations, logics
and imaginaries (Mbembe 1993:345-74, 1990:7-24; see also Politique
Africaine 1991). As will be discussed in this paper, it is all this ‘capacity-
building’ or bricolages that later enabled African rulers to reinforce their
hegemonic position over their subjects.
As regards the subaltern groups, which welcomed the rhetoric of po-
litical changes with excitement which sometimes bordered on fanaticism,
the democratization process was rather looked upon as the embodiment
of the historical perspective to dissent from the postcolonial rule. Moreo-
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ver, many of them equated this process with the prospect to deconstruct
the social and political order that made possible the maintenance of the
prevailing ignoble system, and its continuation over the longue durée. In
other words, for many Africans, the restoration of the multi-party sys-
tem represented the dreams of getting rid of their despotic, predatory
and kleptomaniac regimes (Monga 1995:359-79; Mpom 1994).
Yet one could not pertinently speak about the experience of multi-
partyism in post-colonial Africa without acknowledging or mentioning
what I call after James Ferguson7 the ‘teleological meta-narratives’ of
democracy. By this expression, I mean a system of knowledge, and a
series of discourses, theories and ideologies that were constructed around
the idea of political liberalization in Africa, and that helped to frame or
systematize its principles, moreover to orientate its form, expression,
mode of functioning and representation (Nyang’oro 1994). But what-
ever their orientations, assumptions, tenets or theoretical oppositions,
all these savoirs shared the same messianic approach to democracy and
the same uni-linear evolutionist vision about the social and political ad-
justment many African countries were going through in the early 1990s.
Indeed political liberalization, as envisaged by both developmentalist
and modernist philosophies, assumed not only the universal principle of
elective representative, good governance, freedom, fair competition and
alternation, but also embraced the enlightenment ideals of change and
betterment. Neo-liberal ideologues held multi-party politics and democ-
racy up as a condition sine qua non to any sustainable advancement in the
economic, social and political domains in Africa. That is why, the
catchphrase that western maîtres-penseurs regularly repeated to their Afri-
can pupils was: ‘No development without democracy.’ The reason was
that democracy and liberal politics suggested for these self-proclaimed
‘visionaries’ the end of corruption, nepotism, patrimonialism, favourit-
ism, clientelism, dictatorship, etc. in Africa. But what was pervasive in
these modernist meta-narratives of democracy was the naïve certainty
that the ongoing democratization process would move African countries
from an old system to a New Age: from crisis to progress, backward
societies to modern nations, stagnation to sustainable growth, etc (World
Bank 1989). The optimistic and sometimes excessive account of the
democratization process in many sub-Saharan countries indicated the
extent to which what some analysts hastily called the ‘second
decolonization’, or ‘African revolution’ (Kamto 1997:177-95) had cap-
tivated the modernist thought of the early 1990s.
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In this contribution, which does not claim to assess the experience of
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, I want to examine how these grand
narratives have affected Africans’ imagination and the way they repre-
sent multi-party politics, and how as a result of these millenarian ideolo-
gies, many of them have transformed the political adjustment into a sort
of mythology of redemption. However, what is much more important to
me is to demonstrate that modernist (developmentalist and evolution-
ist) formulations of the democratization process in Africa as what
Comaroff and Comaroff (1999:27) call a ‘replay of euro-capitalist mo-
dernity’ have failed to take up theoretical and methodological challenges
that these theories encountered when they travelled from the West to
the post-colonial Africa. Moreover, ‘the fault of analytic hurry’ which,
according to Callaghy (1994:248), is the weakness of most Africanists,
has prevented them from paying attention to: (1) the amazing ability of
African rulers to adapt to modern changes; (2) their inventive spirit, and
their art of resourcefulness and hustling; (3) their skill at regaining con-
trol over people and local spaces through the manipulation of the collec-
tive memory, and the reactivation of ethnic, regional, religious and paro-
chial solidarities; (4) their capacity to reformulate the old modes of ac-
cumulation and domination and redistribution of state resources; (5)
their talent for ‘capturing’ their political opponents; (6) their gift for
transforming the political adjustment into a despotic adjustment, etc. In
short, what I want to stress in this paper is the ability of African auto-
crats to invent their own democracy. What the African popular imagina-
tion now derisively refers to as ‘the rule by military’ (militocracy), ‘ethno-
democracy’ (ethnocracy) or ‘democracy of the mouth and belly’
(mangecratie) is the product of the African genius.
I will use the Cameroonian case to illustrate this form of demo-cracy
that has become the constitutive dimension of many African regimes’
mode of governance. Cameroon’s experience is interesting for several
reasons: first, right from the beginning, the experience of the multi-party
system in this country has been simply downgraded to a sheer struggle
for power, or has taken a Manichean pattern of good and evil. Second,
Cameroonian demo-cracy,8 as I will be discussing in the following pages,
is the archetype of these new forms of kratos (powers) that today sustain
both the hegemonic and accumulative project of the dominant classes in
sub-Saharan Africa. These new forms of domination which emerged for
the most part in the early 1990s are often translated by disenchanted
but nonetheless humorous Africans, and notably Cameroonians as
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ethnocracy, warlord-cracy, kleptocracy, poverty-cracy, NGO-cracy, AID-cracy.
All these systems or dispositifs, to use Foucault’s words (1979), enable a
handful of people (whether from the ruling class, the opposition or the
so-called civil society) to maintain their dominant position, thanks to
their control over state resources and international donations.9 Last but
not least, this country exemplifies Africa’s ‘fiddle system of democracy’
(traficotage de la démocratie). It also gives a good illustration of the
ability of the Biya regime to defraud democratic principles, outwit or
mislead international organizations (Banoch 1992; Mbarga 1993; van
der Walle 1990). I will focus my analysis on what the official rhetoric in
Cameroon has initially called ‘advanced democracy’ (démocratie avancée),
and then ‘pacified or appeased democracy’ (démocratie apaisée), not only
to give an insight into this Cameroonian system of gouvernorat, but also
to decode a routinized procedure that since 1991 has been mediating
the relationship between the ruling CPDM regime and the civil society
at large in this country.
Democratization Process: The Power of the Sans-culottes
In many respects, the experience of political liberalization in Cameroon
was distinctive from what many African countries were going through in
the early 1990s. This singularity could be related to a number of factors:
the strong opposition of the conservative ruling class to what its mem-
bers perceived as an adventure and a great threat to the stability of the
country and the national unity; the violence and uncertainty that paved
the way for its birth, and continues even today to impinge on its prac-
tices and modes of expression; the tragedy and disaster it brought about;
the bloodshed and deaths that macadamized its path; the fervour and
enthusiasm it aroused; the energy and strength it mobilized; the radical-
ism and fanaticism it led to; the ethnic withdrawals and parochial soli-
darities it exacerbated, the confusion and upheaval it created; the dreams
and expectancies it stimulated, and finally the disappointment and frus-
tration it gave rise to.
In some other African countries, the democratization process came
about as a result of arrangements between different groups of interests10
willing to remodel the absolutist authoritarian state. However, in
Cameroon the political liberalization rested neither on any deal between
the ruling CPDM party on the one hand, and the opposition movement
and the civil society on the other hand, or between the holders of politi-
cal power and ordinary people (Courade and Sindjoun 1996; Gros 2003;
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Sindjoun 1996:27-51; Sindjoun and Owona 1997:217-45). Nor did it
emerge as the consequence of an agreement between these social pro-
tagonists to ‘good-govern’ the Cameroonian society, at least to set up a
political public sphere where free citizens and ‘autonomous public body,’
to use Habermas’s expression (1989:145, 1984), could enjoy a freedom
of speech, assembly, movement, etc. It is not exaggerating to say that in
Cameroon, the demand for political liberalization rather engendered a
misunderstanding between the pro-democracy movement and the con-
ventional CPDM regime, which was reluctant to give up its unlimited
privileges and monopolistic rights to the state resources (Monga 1998).
While the pro-opposition movement and the population from the
grassroots welcomed the democratization process and the upsurge of
the oppositional policy as promising social and political transformations,
the conservative Biya regime rather viewed them as threatening and dan-
gerous for its maintenance in power. This dissension was all the more
exacerbated by the CPDM government’s strong belief that there was no
need to adopt the multi-party system so passionately claimed by pro-
democracy activists because since 1985, the country had had democracy
and freedom of expression within the ruling CPDM party whose Chair-
man – who is also the Cameroonian Head of State – once described it as
a ‘democratic and liberal party open to all trends’.11 As a result of this
professed dogma which claimed a divine truth beyond dispute, any overt
attempt to oppose the deification of the Head of State, the man who
allegedly was in power by the grace of God,12 or any vague desire to
found a political party was automatically understood as an act of subver-
sion, public order offence and even breach of national security: a ‘crime’
which in the context of authoritarianism was liable to a life imprison-
ment or death penalty. Fortunately, the resistance to multi-party politics
vanished when, under increasing domestic difficulties and foreign pres-
sures, notably from France and international organizations (IMF and
the World Bank), the Biya regime was forced to decompress the former
authoritarian one-party system.
But the political adjustment that the conservative Biya regime finally
conceded did not put an end to the disagreement between the ruling
party and the opposition movement which imagined change and democ-
racy in Cameroon differently. Indeed, for all these young men and women
who from May 1990 onwards heroically entered into rebellion against
the authoritarian ‘Regime of New Deal’ (Regime du Renouveau), as the
ruling CPDM regime is officially designated, or courageously voiced their
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exasperation against the Father of the Nation, the new era called ‘age of
democracy’ was the time of defiance and insubordination. It signalled a
resistance against a system which, for over 30 years, had silenced people
or fossilized their thought, and an opposition to a form of governance
that transformed citizens into mere subjects. The social protest move-
ment that came to be popularized in Cameroon as ‘ghost town opera-
tion’ (opération villes mortes) exemplified both the aesthetics of indiscipline
and subversion, and the front of refusal instigated by the opposition
movement. This ‘ghost town operation,’ which Cameroonians experi-
enced between 1991 and 1993, was a collective action that engaged sub-
altern groups in a ritual of deconstruction of the established authority,
or in the process of what  Bayart (1993:247) calls ‘de-totalization of
power.’ If in some regions of the country the social movement was peaceful
and well organized, in other areas, it rather degenerated into a culture of
riot that often led to violent confrontations between security forces and
pro-democracy activists, most notably young ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘com-
batants’.
However, the most remarkable feature of this deconstructive process
was the shift from what James Scott (1990) calls a ‘hidden transcript’ of
resistance, which was the main characteristic of the mode of dissidence
of the past, to an overt or public practice of indiscipline and subversion:
truth was no longer spoken behind the backs of the officials as people
used to in the old days, but rather to their face. The practice of insubor-
dination was no longer concealed or disguised through rumours, slander,
gossip, jokes and dissimulation which insinuated a critique of the domi-
nant classes, while hiding behind anonymity and malice, but was rather
publicized through popular songs or music, paintings, graffiti on the walls,
newspaper articles or cartoons, etc (Monga 1997:146-69; Nyamnjoh
1999:93-106). Power incarnated by the figure of the despot or what the
man in the street calls the ‘Lion-man’ (L’Homme-lion), was depicted in
the popular literature as bestial, ferocious, murderous, sadistic, malevo-
lent, diabolic, etc. Sometimes, it was sketched as voracious, greedy and
grotesque (Mbembe 2001; Ndedi Penda 1992). For the young ‘freedom
fighters’ and ‘revolutionaries’ who were at the forefront of what I have
elsewhere called ‘the practice of ungovernmentality’ (Ndjio 2002), this
devilish power which was ‘eating’ the state or starving Cameroonians,
deserved nothing but a red card that would send it off. To the best of my
knowledge, it was the first time in the history of this post-colonial state
that the ruler was publicly questioned, shouted at, vilified or slandered:
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‘Who is the thief? Paul Biya’ (Thief man na wou? Paul Biya); ‘people are
suffering, while Paul Biya enjoys a happy life’ (People di sofa, Paul Biya di
chop moni), yelled the protesters vociferously and defiantly as they took
to the streets in Douala and Yaounde (the main cities of Cameroon) and
in other cities of the country.
From mid-1990 up to the late 1993, the daily performance of what
James Scott (1990:18) calls the ‘infrapolitics of the subordinate groups’
was reduced to the rudimentary action of desecrating the state power,
but above all of symbolically killing the despot. People did it by defiling
his countless doubles (images), which generally invaded the public space,
or by turning them into objects of derision and laughter. In some cities
or towns of the country where the experience of the ghost town opera-
tion was most dramatic, young people expressed their anger by taking it
out on the Head of State’s giant portraits, after a violent clash with the
forces of law and order: they would put out the President’s eyes on his
images with points or nails, pour drinks on his face, tear his picture up
and use it as toilet paper, or coat his face with their excrement. This
provocation could go further when the offenders in a general frenzy would
simply cut his head off. It seems as if through these symbolic acts, these
‘delinquents’ wanted to drive the ‘Father of the Nation,’ his cumber-
some phantoms and harmful totems (images) out of the public domain.
In many respects, this practice of ungovernmentality went along with the
culture of ‘pleasure’ (jouissance) that entailed above all new uses of bod-
ies, new forms of desire and happiness, or new ways of living and dying
(Ndjio 2005:265-94). Thanks to this Dionysian culture, the postcolonial
subjects found themselves engaged in a moral ‘economy of ejaculation’
(de Boeck 1998:790), which exalted vicious pleasure, drunkenness, de-
bauchery and lechery, or made the apology of ludicrousness, obscenity
and vulgarity. In this world of ecstasy and fantasy, the public space itself
became a site of invention of new forms of indiscipline and indocility
that primarily resorted to a popular use of sex and body as a privileged
mode of challenging established logics that guided the post-colonial public
sphere (Ndjio 2005:277-8).
Another important aspect of the ‘ghost town operation’ is that it
prompted the emergence of a ‘collective will of people’ (Foucault 1991,
1979), whose action was less motivated by what some analysts simplis-
tically call the ‘logic of clientelistic and patrimonial reciprocity’ (Chabal
and Daloz 1999:37-39) than their will to pull down one of the most
conservative and corrupt regimes in Africa. Through this revolutionary
5. Ndjio.pmd 04/12/2009, 20:05124
125Ndjio: Millennial Democracy and Spectral Reality
project, the newly emerging ‘civil society’ (see Kamto 1997:177-95;
Monga 1998) plotted the elaboration of a ‘counter-memory’ of the
postcolonial state, as Michel Foucault (1979) would have put it. Moreo-
ver, it attempted to reverse or undermine what I call, after Gayatri Spivak
(1985:342) the official ‘historiographic metalepsis’ which sanctified the
postcolonial ruler and his power. For example, when the despot made
himself appear as the ‘Incarnation of Rigour’ (L’Incarnation de la Rigueur),
‘Father of the Nation’ (Père de la Nation), ‘Providential Guide’ (Guide
Providentiel), ‘Grand Helmsman’ (Grand Timonier) or ‘Apostle of Peace’
(L’Apôtre de la Paix), the popular imagination mischievously misrepre-
sented him as ‘the incarnation of the Cameroonian predicament’ (Incar-
nation du mal Camerounais), ‘bogeyman’ (père fouettard) or ‘big thief ’ (chef
bandit). When the governmental propaganda boasted the incumbent
regime as ‘advanced democracy’ (démocratie avancée), the commoners
strongly believed that they were instead experiencing ‘advanced autoc-
racy’ (autocratie avancée). November 1982, which, according to official
exegetes signalled the beginning of a new age called the era of ‘rigor and
moralization’ (rigueur et moralisation), was rather interpreted by the sub-
altern groups as the birth of tragedy, the debut of suffering, despair and
demoralization.
However, the main singularity of this newly constituted civil society
was its capacity to transcend parochial solidarities and ethnic bounda-
ries, and to rise above the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1993). As far as
one can go back to the history of the post-independent Cameroon, it
was the first time that political actions were driven less by the ‘need to
acquire the patrimonial means of one’s political legitimacy’ (Chabal and
Daloz 1999:37) than a powerful utopia that united common people
against their rulers: ‘change’ (changement). For the pro-democracy move-
ment, change meant, not only normalizing the political situation in the
country but also changing the existing political order, the method of
government together with the renewal of the political leadership. The
holding of the Sovereign National Conference, that many people were
insistently asking for,13 embodied the project to reframe the postcolonial
state, to restore a state of law or to transform the way of making politics
in this country (see Eboussi Boulaga 1993; Kamto 1997:177-95;
Sindjoun and Owona 1997:217-45 ). Even a cursory and superficial ex-
amination of the opposition movement of the early 1990s would cor-
roborate that its radicalization, notably between 1990-1993,14 and the
culture of riot and martyrdom it engendered, left no room for political
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calculus, clientelistic transactions or dealings with the ruling CPDM re-
gime. Indeed, the period of ‘ghost town operation’ (1991-1993) inaugu-
rated an era when political elites, especially those who were connected
to the opposition primarily drew their legitimacy and prestige, not from
their aptitude at building up clientelistic and patrimonial networks from
the local to the national level, but rather from their radicalism and fierce
opposition to the incumbent regime. The more intransigent and extrem-
ist an opposition leader was, the more popular. At that time when the
relationship between the governmental coalition and its opposition was
dominated by the dynamics of hostility and confrontation, colluding with
the scornful CPDM regime was equivalent to political suicide. While
for the CPDM leaders, making any concession to the opposition was
likely to be interpreted by their sympathizers as a weakness and lack of
authority; those politicians (whether from the opposition or the ruling
party) who transgressed this principle endured a political setback from
their supporters.
There are many  former prominent opposition leaders who lost popular
support, and even undermined their political careers, just for having played
what James Rush (1990) aptly calls ‘the dance of collaboration’ with the
incumbent CPDM regime. In many respects, collaborating with the
CPDM government or practicing the ‘politics of the belly,’ meant ac-
cepting a ministerial or administrative post, or ‘eating the CPDM’s ‘dirty
money’ (argent sale),’ as one local newspaper once formulated (see Le
Messager, 25 June 1994). What came to be popularized in the country as
toum man embodied the figure of the traitor who ‘goes over to the en-
emy’. A toum man was not only a ‘chameleon-politician or turn-coat poli-
tician’ (politicien caméléon), a ‘political nomad’ (transhumant politique) or
a ‘political prostitute’ (prostitué politique ) who switched from one party
or client to another, but also a renegade who gave up his commitment or
who betrayed a good cause for personal interests (Challenge-Hebdo 21
June 1991). But what did the mythology of democracy and political lib-
eralization mean for these young men and women who everyday were clash-
ing with the police and gendarmes, and at the very worst were shot dead?
Democracy and Collective Fantasies
We cannot dissociate the call for democracy that gripped almost the
entire African continent from the mythology that the democratization
process embodied from the very beginning, or from the dreams and uto-
pias that multi-party system came to incarnate in the early 1990s. Nor
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could we have a better understanding of the experience of political liber-
alization in this part of the world, unless we pay attention to what
Comaroff and Comaroff (2000:330) cogently call the ‘millennial opti-
mism’ and the gospel atonement with which multi-party politics was
associated. Indeed, this messianic vision that spread all over the Black
continent in the early 1990s invested the liberal politics with the capac-
ity to transform the living conditions of marginalized Africans who were
caught in the nets of dictatorship and authoritarianism. In a context es-
sentially marked by wretchedness and anxiety, liberal democracy pre-
sented itself to the powerless and other second-class citizens as a
millennial project that provided them with optimism, self-confidence
and positive expectations for their future. Only the acknowledgment of
the enthusiasm and exuberance with which many Africans in general,
and Cameroonians in particular, welcomed the restoration of multi-
partyism in their country, could inform us about the perspective to achieve
through the democratization process the eagerly awaiting ‘30 glorieuses’
that an unachieved de-colonization had relegated to what Denis Jeambar
rightly calls ‘30 ignominieuses’15.
This redemptive narrative of both democracy and multi-party politics
influenced even the dynamic popular culture, which became by the end
of 1990 the vivid expression of the general faith that suffering, poverty
and distress, which were commonplace for ordinary Cameroonians, would
soon be forgotten. Take, for example, cartoons caricatures and sketches
that were extremely popular in the early 1990s (Monga 1997:146-69;
Njamnjoh 1999:93-106). Most of these figurative expressions, which
regularly appeared in pro-opposition newspapers, did not content them-
selves with narrating the social drama experienced by many
Cameroonians. They also imagined a free, egalitarian and prosperous
society that contrasted with the prevailing inhuman and vicious society.
In many respects, the democratic Cameroon, about which this popular
culture fantasized, was a society where broken subjects became the mas-
ters of their own destiny; where tamed bodies slowly moved from the
process of crucifixion to that of resurrection and redemption, from so-
cial alienation and abjection to social promotion, from a spectral condi-
tion to a pleasant one, etc. In this fantastic world projected in satirical
newspapers such as Le Messager Popoli, Challenge-Hebdo, Porc-epic or Mami
Wata, the ‘sovereign people’ seized (or could seize) the power, got the
autocrat arrested, and dragged him by force before a popular assembly
presided over by leaders of the opposition and pro-democracy activists;
5. Ndjio.pmd 04/12/2009, 20:05127
128 AJIA 11: 2, 2008
they would force him to give back the money he had stolen from the
people (see also Mbembe 2001:149-53).
Another example of this imagined society are furnished by Lapiro de
Mbanga’s well-known songs, Mimba we (Remember us) and Don lefam
Tara (Don’t give up my friend) that enchanted the slum dwellers of New
Bell in Douala or Madagascar and Briqueterie in Yaounde, or Anne-
Marie Ndzié’s famous freedom chant, Liberté, that became the rallying
song of many young ‘freedom fighters’ who regularly took to the streets
during the period of ‘ghost town operation’ and civil disobedience cam-
paigns of the early 1990s. These chants attracted people, not only be-
cause they enabled the populace to be serene in the face of tragedy and
affliction inflicted on them by the ‘Regime of New Deal’ but also be-
cause they conveyed powerful messages of courage, resourcefulness, hope,
optimism and self-reliance. In short, they prophesied a better tomorrow
for the underprivileged and the powerless. No surprise then that pro-
democracy activists and opposition members who challenged the secu-
rity forces daily chanted these popular freedom songs each time they
endured police brutality: ‘No condition is permanent in this world; one
day, one day situation must change in this country, ‘Liberty, liberty, thanks
to Mighty God, at last we are free’ (Liberté, liberté, Dieu Tout-Puissant,
nous sommes enfin libres merci).16 No wonder that militants of the Social
Democratic Front translated their party’s acronym as Suffer Don Finish
(Suffering is over). By this, they meant that the institution of the multi-
party system would put an end to the kleptocratic and corrupt ‘Regime
of New Deal’, once described as a regime whose main goal was to ‘make
Cameroonians become definitely poor’, to quote one young motorbike-
taxi driver from Douala.
Yet, for all these enthusiastic and fanatical opposition supporters,
this mythology of political liberalization was not simply a matter of lib-
erty, good governance, freedom of expression and assembly. It conveyed
above all a redemptive promise that was manifest in the ideal of ‘change’
(changement), as Cameroonians called it. The quest for change was not
only the main obsession of many of them. It was also what they were
fighting for, and were even ready to die for: people courageously took to
the streets and asked for the resignation of the ‘Father of the Nation,’
because they wanted change; they defied the state authority because of
‘change’; they challenged the established logics that guided the post-
colonial public sphere for the same purpose. Between 1990 and 1993,
the only political discourses that interested people were precisely those
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that echoed their expectations of change, or those that promised them a
new beginning. At that time when everybody was obsessed with the idea
of ‘change’ and that all political debates were centred on this matter,17
the opposition movement had nothing on its political agenda but the
achievement of this change. The term ‘change’ was so fashionable that
none of its leaders could end his/her speech without referring to this
magical theme  or giving a pledge to ‘make things change in the coun-
try’: a commitment that generally stirred up thunderous applause from
the crowd. How could it be otherwise when the more convincing dis-
courses of that epoch were the most radical ones, or those that emphati-
cally advocated the replacement of the ever-lasting Biya regime? In ad-
dition, acknowledging the dedication of the pro-democracy movement
to change, it seems as if the struggle for democracy that mobilized many
Cameroonians at that time was simply the fight for change in this coun-
try. No wonder that the coalition of the opposition parties was called the
‘Union for Change’ (Union pour le changement), and that all pro-democ-
racy activists were dubbed the ‘Front Allies for Change’ (Fronts alliés pour
le changement), in opposition to the CPDM barons who were disdainfully
labelled the ‘Conservative Forces or Opposition to Change’ (Forces
conservatrices ou de l’ immobilisme). But the question one may ask here is:
why were people so obsessed with the idea of changement? Why did the
quest for a democratic society come to be simplified or narrowed to a
struggle for change?
The answer might be that, this fantastic ideal of ‘change’ touched the
imagination of the population at large, because it augured the return to
the fatherland of thousands of Cameroonian nationalists who had been
forced to go into exile by the authoritarian regimes of Amadou Ahidjo,
and his successor Paul Biya. Moreover, the dream of ‘change’ revived
the old nationalist aspiration to create an egalitarian society, or to make
Cameroon ‘a land of hope and happiness’ for all Cameroonians, and not
an archipelago of injustice and despair (Joseph 1977; Mbembe 1996;
Um Nyobe 1989, 1984). However, many people came to associate the
democratization process with that of ‘change’ because the latter suppos-
edly would change people’s desperate living conditions. As a market
woman from the Douala central market explained in the local newspa-
per, Challenge-Hebdo,
The changement will bring job and money to people. People will no
longer endure poverty and suffering. Everyone will live a better life
like when the Kassa’a (she meant the former President Amadou Ahidjo)
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was in power. Not that some eat alone, while others have nothing to
eat. This is not fair. We want change in this country.18
The lady’s opinion reminded me of the snatches of conversation I picked
up by chance in April 1991 between two middle-aged men who were
hotly discussing in a bar in New Bell, the most populated district of
Douala. In reaction to his partner who wondered why the word ‘change’
was on everybody’s lips,’ one of the two who was named Tagni said that
it was because ‘the changement would prevent Paul Biya and his cliques
from stealing people’s money and keep it in the banks in Switzerland.’
He added that, the coming ‘change’ would send all the ‘thieves’ (thiefmans)
to prison, if they did not give back all the money they had embezzled.
But his friend who was rather sceptical, questioned whether ‘the ‘change’
would bring a real change in the country,’ and whether once in power,
‘the opposition leaders would not misappropriate the public funds or
deprive too the populations from their money as CPDM dignitaries did.’
Tagni’s response was that the opposition could not replicate the former
predatory system because ‘the changement would give power to people
and not to longs crayons’ (educated elites).
These different statements only expressed a collective fantasy that
transformed the ideal of change into a panacea that would solve any
existential problem the natives were confronted with, a cry of ‘Open
Sesame’ that had a magic power to make even the impossible become
possible. In many respects, the holding of a SNC (sovereign national
conference) that people were insistently asking for would assumedly bring
about the eagerly awaited great transformation, or ‘would make the real
change possible in the country,’ as one leader of the opposition move-
ment explained in a local newspaper (L’opinion, 6 June 1991). That is
why by March 1991, 40 opposition parties (out of 47 political parties
that were registered at that time) formed a coalition which main goal
was to compel the ruling CPDM regime to convene a SNC, which was
proclaimed mandatory for the country. However the conservative Presi-
dent declared it ‘baseless,’ because he strongly believed that his regime
was already a well-established democratic system, and therefore needed
no transitional government, much less the holding of a SNC. Thus, the
general civil disobedience and the protracted and devastating ‘ghost town
operation’ of the early 1990s aimed at forcing the reluctant CPDM gov-
ernment to concede to their demands for a SNC.
For the university students who played a decisive role in the social
movements of the early 1990s, the SNC would presumably bring a solu-
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tion to the anachronism of the higher education system in Cameroon,
the inadequate infrastructures of the university, the language barriers
between Anglophone and Francophone students, the poor material con-
ditions of the students, the growing unemployment rates among univer-
sity graduates and the militarization of the university campus following
the 26 May 1990 students’ demonstration (Konings 2002:179-204). As
one leader of the National Coordination of Cameroon Students, popu-
larly known as Parlement put it:
A Sovereign National Conference is a forum for collective self-confes-
sion, a platform to point out our past mistakes and elaborate new
codes of conduct; a process that will inevitably lead to a positive
restructuring of our unadapted education system and its mediocre
university, and that will eventually lay the foundation for the resolu-
tion of post-university problem such as unemployment.19
But if the call for the SNC gained a tremendous support from the grass-
roots or took a particular tone in this country, it was because many peo-
ple considered the SNC a godsend that the discriminatory regime
prevented them from enjoying. According to Mono Djana, one of the
ideologues of the ruling CPDM, people were ready to die for the SNC,
because the opposition leaders made illiterate peasants and poor urban
populations believe that it was a big coffer full of money. President Paul
Biya allegedly refused to open this case and inject the money it con-
tained into the national economy which was cash-strapped at that time.
Moreover, it was said that he kept the case closed to other people, while
at the same time he generously opened it to his own Beti kinsmen, or let
the money only flow towards his native region in the South Province of
the country. This explains, according to Mono Djana (1997:24-26), why
many people were determined to force Paul Biya, not only to release the
coffer which held the ‘magic money’ but also to step down (see also
Mono Djana 1999, 1992). The success of the SNC in other African
countries like Benin (Nzouankeu 1993; Takougang and Krieger 1998)
comforted people in their faith that ‘want it or not, the Sovereign Na-
tional Conference must be held’ (faire quoi, faire quoi Conférence Nationale
Souveraine, il y aura) or that ‘Biya must go’.
Undoubtedly, the charismatic leader of the SDF, Ni John Fru Ndi,
was the leading figure of the ‘Front of Allies for Change.’ The aura,
courage and popularity of the man positioned his party at the top of the
opposition movement in the country. Never before had a local politician
been as glorified as the leader of the SDF was at his heyday. Between
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1991 and 1996, he was so popular with both the rural populations and
the underprivileged of the urban areas that his fame sometimes took a
form of idolatry or a religious cult. In a number of houses, private offices
or squares, the portraits and pictures of the man whose sympathizers af-
fectionately called ‘Chairman’ had replaced those of the Head of State.
In July 1992 when I travelled to my village a few months before the
controversial presidential election of October of the same year, I was
really amazed to discover that most villagers were wearing clothes with
Fru Ndi’s images or were considered SDF supporters. Even my old grand-
mother had the man’s icon at the head of her bed. For her, as with other
people I talked to, Ni John Fru Ndi was more than a simple political
leader whose supporters were attracted by his political program or dis-
course. He was above all a national hero who united many Cameroonians
against their common enemy: the Biya regime. Many people referred to
his party (SDF) as a salvation political party that would put an end to
people’s distress and suffering. As one of my relatives who was a faithful
SDF militant explained to me,
When Ni John Fru Ndi will unseat Paul Biya and achieve the
changement, people no longer pay tax, electricity bills, and other charges
that go into the pockets of the thiefman from Yaounde (he referred to
the Head of State who lives in Yaounde). The price of cocoa and
coffee will be increased. You too will enjoy the changement, because
when you finish your studies, you will find a good job and earn lots of
money. Everybody will be happy, not like the present day where you
go to school, but you cannot get a job when you graduate. And even
when you do find some, you work but they don’t pay you.
Other people considered Ni John Fru Ndi a redeemer-prophet who was
entrusted with the messianic mission to lead his people to the eagerly
awaited SNC, which was seen by many as the ultimate achievement of
the political struggle in the country. More importantly, if the man was
able to magnetize the public, it was because many people perceived him
as the only powerful fetish which could help them fulfil their main aspi-
ration: remove the ghostly Paul Biya who was held responsible for peo-
ple’s misfortune and suffering from power. No wonder that in the regions
favourable to the opposition movement or which were in the frontline of
the ghost town operation, Ni John Fru Ndi received almost a plebiscite
during the aforementioned controversial presidential election of Octo-
ber 1992.20 In the following pages, I want to examine the two dominant
modes of rationality employed by the Biya regime, not only to corrupt
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the democratization process in this country, but also to strangle or sup-
press the opposition movement, at least to render it less effective. These
two modes of governmentality took respectively the euphemistic and for-
mal appellation of ‘advanced democracy’ (démocratie avancée) and later
‘appeased or pacified democracy’ (démocratie apaisée).
Démocratie avancée: The Birth of the Tragedy
First of all, it is useful to emphasize that the political reform of the early
1990s that is improperly called a democratization process did not really
affect the legal or judicial structure of the former authoritarian system,21
nor did it have a positive impact on the political public sphere. In many
respects, it seemed rather to marshal the project to reinforce the state’s
authority or to extend its scope of domination and control over the citi-
zens and the political landscape. As I have shown in a previous article
(Ndjio 2005:265-94), the democratization process in Cameroon did not
lead to the constitution of a democratic and liberal public sphere which
guaranteed freedom of assembly and association, and the rights of
citizens to freely express and publicize their opinion about matters of
general interest, etc.22 Instead, it had given way in this country to the
establishment of a ‘manipulated public sphere,’ not in the sense
Habermas (1989) understands it, but rather as a politically structured
space which was permanently overloaded with signs and symbols that
articulated the state authority or represented its power, as well as drama-
tized its importance. One can recall in this respect the presidential
thoughts and declarations of principles printed on notice boards or writ-
ten on the facade of main state buildings, or his speeches which were con-
stantly and repeatedly echoed or commented by the state-controlled media.
If the introduction of multi-party politics in 1990 changed anything
in this country, it was the perversion of the political liberalization by the
ruling CPDM regime, or at least its transformation into what came to be
institutionalized from 1991 onwards as ‘advanced democracy’. This tropi-
cal democracy which had negatively affected the lives of many
Cameroonians meant recourse to violence, intimidation and manoeu-
vres in order to muzzle or ostracize the opposition, notably members of
the hardcore opposition mentioned earlier. At the time of the ‘advanced
democracy’, opposition was only tolerated if its members were ‘moder-
ate’ or ‘responsible,’ and did not advocate the dismissal of the ‘Father of
the Nation,’ the holding of the SNC or the organization of fair and
democratic elections in the country. The Biya regime also put up with a
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‘responsible opposition’ or a ‘civilised civic society’, which did not de-
nounce the kleptomaniac behaviour of the politico-bureaucratic elites.
Along the same lines, for this regime, the conscientious and responsible
political opponents were what people derisively called the ‘oppositionists
to the opposition’ (opposants de l’opposition); that is, political opponents
who were ‘willing to have talks with the government and constituted
authorities,’ or were opposed to members of the hardcore opposition
coalition who formed the ‘Front Allies for Change’.23 This was the case
for members of the opposition group known as the ‘moderates’ (modérés)
whose collusion with the ruling CPDM was generally praised by state
officials and pro-government media as a sign of responsibility and patri-
otism. It was also the case for members of the so-called ‘civil society’
who were ‘neutrally’ connected to the ruling CPDM party, or members
of many figurative human rights associations hastily created by the gov-
ernment in order to mislead the international community.
This new mode of governmentality implied as well the conversion of
the public space into a militarized and martial space in which order and
peace had to be maintained by all means (militocracy). At the time of the
advanced democracy, the state power strove, not only to recapture the
public sphere that was once controlled by young ‘freedom fighters’ and
‘revolutionaries’ but also to dramatize its presence where its authority
was less perceptible. One could mention in this respect the formation in
July 1991 of a special armed force unit baptized Commandement
Opérationnel in regions mostly favourable to the opposition movement,
the creation of new administrative units, military legions, the increase of
the number of armed forces, administrators and magistrates, the consti-
tution of ethnic militias and vigilante groups, and above all the retour en
force of some caciques of the conservative ruling CPDM regime. This
was the case of Gilbert Andzé Tchoungui, the former Minister of Terri-
torial Administration and patron of the police, who was appointed as
Deputy-Prime Minister in charge of the Territorial Administration, and
Jean Fochivé, the dreaded former boss of the intelligence service, who
became Secretary of State for Internal Security. The promotion of these
two hardliners fit into the government’s scheme of ‘restoring the state
power’, as the official rhetoric called the violence that the postcolonial
state permanently exercised on its subjects. These different measures
were above all part of the government’s effort to create submissive and
docile citizens who had to subjugate their rights to the state authority.
At that time of the advanced democracy, sympathizers of the opposition
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only experienced the state power in its cruellest and most cynical visage.
For these men and women who were constantly chased, arrested, tor-
tured, or at the very worst killed by security forces or ethnic militias, -
because of their political conviction or ethnic origins- , the experience
of life was intrinsically linked to the art of escaping death and tragedy
everyday. 24 Yet, even in its ferocity and intemperance, power was never
banal or trivial in this country. The permanent assaults that this authori-
tarian power exerted on the oppositionists’ bodies were always meant to
remind them that the state authority has ‘the will and the means’, as Mr
Fochivé liked to say.
One imposing aspect of this advanced democracy was that it had over-
simplified the procedures of authority, and the means of violence and
coercion in this country. In deed, from 1991 to 1996, the daily exercise
of (state) power in Cameroon was abridged to the elementary act of
banning, constraint, force, prohibition, confinement, surveillance and
punishment, but also authorization, permission, rewarding, etc. Any
person, thought, action or movement that was likely to challenge the
gospel truth professed by His Excellency and his honourable Ministers
was ostracized. For example, 1991 and 1992 witnessed the detention of
many activist leaders who were subjected after their arrest to a humiliat-
ing and savage treatment by security forces. The same period also her-
alded the interdiction of a great number of independent newspapers which
were very critical about the Biya regime,25 or many independent human
rights organizations, such as CAP-Liberté, OCDH, Human Watch, True
Democracy which played a decisive role in increasing national and inter-
national awareness about the abuse of human rights in Cameroon. These
associations were suspected by the administration of being connected to
the main opposition parties (SDF, UNDP, UPC), and especially of
being manipulated by the Laka’am association, a powerful Bamiléké
lobby-group which was reputed for its strong hostility to the CPDM
government. This period also recorded the dismantlement of all student
movements, most notably the popular Parlement (an active and radical
student movement) whose leaders were expelled from all state universi-
ties, jailed or tracked down by security services and ethnic militias in the
government’s pay (Collectif Changer le Cameroun 1992). At the same time,
the officials managed to create or promote some amenable organiza-
tions, or some private newspapers, such as Le Patriote, La Caravane,
Le Témoin, Le Devoir, Elimbi, etc, which enabled them to maintain a de-
mocracy de facade.
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Yet this mode of exercising power entailed above all a policy of stick-
and-carrot towards the government’s opponents. On the one hand, this
policy referred to an ineradicable custom of bringing members of the
radical opposition, who were contemptuously depicted by pro-CPDM
barons as a ‘bunch of vandals and rioting demonstrators’, under the end-
less process of pacification. In many respects, this art of discipline and
castigation of the political opponents took the form of a real hunt in
which the forces of law and order were the hunters and opposition sup-
porters the quarry. As a matter of fact, from 1991 to 1996 the main task
of the security forces consisted in hunting, tracking down, trapping and
taming Biya’ s political opponents, in the same way that a hunter deals
with its prey. And each time the gendarmes or police ‘captured’ the
oppositionists, they took a cynical delight in exhibiting them on the state-
controlled television as a spoil of war, or humiliating them in public, so
as to remind them that ‘L’Homme-lion is stronger than them,’ or to make
them become less ‘irresponsible and stubborn’. Sometimes, they required
their victims to sing the praises of ‘the Man of the New Deal’ (L’Homme
du Renouveau), as the despot is affectionately called.
However, not all these structures of repression or hunting (police,
gendarmes, army, magistrates, etc.) had a legal or official status. Some
of them were informal, private or extra-judiciary. This was the case of
the Committee for Self-Defence, Commando Delta, Direct Action, the
National Front for Beti Liberation and Essingan Group, the five most
notorious and extremist Beti militias created in the early 1990s by some
Beti officials, and the Presby group (President Biya’s youth organiza-
tion), a fanatic organization closely connected to the ruling CPDM party.
Most of these groups were formed along ethnic or regional lines. More
precisely, they recruited their members exclusively among young Beti
students or unemployed to whom fine promises (government’s assist-
ance, job opportunities in the administration or the army, etc) were made
in order to win their support. Between 1991 and 1996, these associa-
tions played a crucial role in helping the government to implement its
martial policy against the opposition movement, notably members of
the students’ Parlement organization. For example, on several occasions,
the government authority had recourse to these ethnic militias to achieve
various tasks, i.e. maintaining or restoring order in the university cam-
puses, disturbing opposition rallies or demonstrations, but also repress-
ing young pro-democracy activists who were at the forefront of ‘the ghost
town operation’ in the main towns of the country. Most of the victims of
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these ethnic militias who were defined as ‘the New Deal’s defenders’
(défenseurs du Renouveau) were populations from other regions or ethnic
groups which were singled out as ‘enemies’ of the New Deal’ or as ‘stran-
gers’ (allogènes) in opposition to the so-called Beti ‘natives’ (autochthones).
Nonetheless, we will miss another important dimension of this ad-
vanced democracy policy, if we only limit it to a regime of disciplinary
power or a routinized use of violence and coercion which was just one
aspect of the whole complex of what Michel Foucault (1991) has called
‘bio-power.’ As he has cogently demonstrated in Discipline and Punish
(1979), for power to work, it must be able to manage, to control, and
even create details: the more detail, real power, management breeding,
and management units, which in turn breeds more detailed and finely
controlling knowledge. From this Foucauldian perspective, one can read
the advanced democracy policy as an elaborate system of representa-
tions of the Other (opposition members) and a sophisticated construc-
tion of ideological knowledge that enabled between 1991 and 1996 the
CPDM regime to legitimize the violence and humiliation it constantly
inflicted on its political opponents. I will focus my analysis on two main
discursive formations that underpinned this mode of governing people
in the country known as Cameroon.
The first discourse that aimed above all at manipulating the collec-
tive consciousness was associated with the mythology of national unity:
a federal term on which Cameroonians generally agree, regardless of
their ethnic, political or religious affiliations (Sindjoun 1996:27-51). As
developed above, unlike the opposition movement which perceived the
multi-party politics as hopeful because it embodied the project of ‘change’,
the ruling CPDM regime rather viewed the democratization process as
threatening for its maintenance in power. Therefore, throughout 1991,
confronted with unprecedented social and political unrest, the CPDM
government strove through images, pictures, sounds and statements to
systematize a coherent discourse that emphasized the need to preserve
what supposedly brought Cameroonians together: the ‘national unity’
and their pride of belonging to ‘one and indivisible country.’ Eventually
this mythology became the repository of official discourses on peace,
public order and security. In all respects, the (re) invention of this my-
thology of national unity, which since 1960 has been providing ideologi-
cal support for the institutionalization of an autocratic regime in this
country (Alima 1977; Kegne Pokam 1986), went hand in hand with the
government’s project, not only to supersede the ideal of ‘change’ by the
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logics of peace, but also to alter the ongoing democratization process.
Not surprising that, during the presidential election of October 1992,
one of the main slogans of the ruling CPDM party was ‘Vote Paul Biya
for Peace’ or ‘Paul Biya for peace.’ On the other hand, the outgoing
President Paul Biya passed himself off as ‘the candidate for gathering
and unity’ (candidat du rassemblement et de l‘unité), in contrast to his po-
litical opponents who were dubbed ‘apostles of division and enemies to
peace’ (apôtres de la division et ennemis de la paix). Cameroonians were
called upon to make their choice, not between ‘change’ (changement) and
‘opposition to change’ (immobilisme), as the opposition members stressed,
but rather between unity and division, order and disorder, peace and
chaos, stability and instability, etc, as the state-controlled media end-
lessly reminded the public.
In the wake of the brainwashing campaigns initiated by state officials
in order to discredit the opposition movement or to hamper the impact
of the devastating civil disobedience, special programs were regularly
broadcast on the national TV or radio channels on civil wars that were
devastating some African countries. In most cases, these shows were
accompanied by dithyrambic songs that either paid tribute to the ‘Initia-
tor of the New Deal policy,’ or urged Cameroonians to ‘give priority to
peace and stability, whatever their political disagreement.’ Furthermore,
government officials appealed to some actors of the reunification of the
two former French and British Cameroons, not only to explain how
Cameroonians from the two borders of the Moungo river decided after
the Reunification of October 1961 to live in common but also to warn
those ‘irresponsible fellows whose actions were likely to jeopardize the
national unity gained at great cost.’ No wonder that the mythology of
national unity became one of the main justifications for the militarization
of the power that marked the debut of the advanced democracy of the
early 1990s, or the systematization of the policy of ‘pacifying’ and ‘sta-
bilizing’ the country by all means.
Indeed, it was for the sake of national unity and peace that unlimited
rights were given to the forces of law and order to bring the oppositionists’
bodies under the endless process of discipline, or that the Biya regime
reinforced its repressive tendencies that have contributed to its hegemonic
stability (Courade and Sindjoun 1996). It was under the pretext of pres-
ervation of national unity and territorial integrity that the CPDM gov-
ernment was strongly opposed to the holding of SNC or dismissed the
claims of some Anglophone populations for the reintroduction of a fed-
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eral system (Anglophone and Francophone States) or the outright se-
cession of the former Southern Cameroon from the present Republic of
Cameroon. Instead, the Constitution of January 1996 preferred a forma-
tive decentralization system that espoused the form of the ten existing
provinces to federalism, viewed by the regime ideologues as a step to
secession (Awasom 2001).
Another aspect of the ‘advanced democracy’ is that it embodied the
dichotomizing representation of Cameroonians or their classification into
two categories: supporters and opponents, good and bad citizens, re-
sponsible and irresponsible subjects, patriots and the non-patriots,
autochthons and allochthons, allies and enemies, natives and strangers,
etc (Awasom 1999; Konings 2001:169-94; Socpa 2002). This
classificatory policy primarily aimed at exacerbating regional, ethnic,
cultural and linguistic differences. In practice, this process gave way for
instance to the invention of the Beti or Essigan clan that encompassed
populations of the forest region of Cameroon (Centre, Southern and
Eastern Provinces), the Sawa group that gathered peoples from the coastal
region (Littoral and South-western provinces), the Anglo-Bami group
that assembled populations from the Grassfields region (West and North-
west Provinces), and finally the Nordistes that grouped peoples from the
Northern region of the country. Beti and Sawa populations were gener-
ally associated with the ruling CPDM party, while the Anglo-Bamileke
and the Nordistes were connected with the opposition, notably SDF
and UNPD (Union National for Democracy and Progress ). At the time
of the advanced democracy, the political status, privileges and rights one
could enjoy or not, depended above all on one’s position either as a
CPDM supporter or opponent, as a member of Pays Organisateur (the
Beti lobby group which allegedly holds the political power in Cameroon)
or Anglo-Bami, or as an ‘autochthon’ or ‘allochthon.’ Reflecting on this
policy, one can say that what some analysts have rightly termed ‘ethno-
politics’ or ‘autochthony governmentality’ (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh
2000:423-52) can be seen above all as the art of (re) inventing differ-
ence. As a matter of fact, political opposition was equated with regional
and ethnic differences: the opposant was the allogène or the ‘alien,’ while
the supporter of the ruling CPDM party was the autochtone or the ‘son of
the soil,’ who needed to be protected against the invasion and cumber-
some presence of the allochthons from the Grassfields region (Awasom
2001; Socpa 2002).
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For example, between 1991 and 1996, the Biya regime enacted a
series of laws, which were purportedly and ostensibly designed to pro-
tect the ‘autochthons’ and the ‘natives’ who allegedly feared of being
overwhelming or outvoting by Anglo-Bami ‘settlers’ or ‘came no gos,’ in
their native region (see Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000:434-45). This
was the case with the Electoral Code of 1992 and the January 1996
Constitution which not only institutionalized the ethno-politics in this
country but also endorsed the CPDM regime’s divide-and-rule policy,
which was based above all on the exclusion or marginalization of a cross-
section of populations. For example, the Electoral Code required that
the list of candidates to be presented by political parties in a constitu-
ency must reflect the sociological components of this constituency. This
means the mandatory inclusion of ‘autochthon’ populations or the ‘sons
of the soil’ in the list of candidates presented by a political party. In the
same lines, in its preamble and in Article 57(3), the Constitution of
January 1996 upheld the state’s obligation to ‘protect minorities and
preserve the rights of indigenous populations.’ Moreover, this law stated
that ‘the Chairperson of each Regional Council and Local Government
region shall be an indigene of the area.’ As Awasom (2001:22) rightly
puts it, ‘the emphasis of the 1996 Constitution was on the rights of
‘indigenes’ and ‘minorities’ against other nationals considered ‘outsid-
ers’ and ‘strangers.’’ To phrase it differently, priority was given to ‘eth-
nic,’ ‘indigenous’ or ‘autochthonous’ citizens, while the concept of na-
tional citizenship was relegated to the background. This constitution, as
Awasom (2001:23-4) further explains, ‘stratified citizenship by starting
first with belonging to an ethnic group, district or province before any
national consideration.’
What deserves to be stressed here is that these different laws have
been instrumental in the conservative CPDM regime’s bid not only to
distort the democratic principles, but also to maintain its hegemonic
stability, by impeding through ‘legal’ means individuals or groups who
were likely to pose a threat to its conservation of power. For example
between 1992 and 1996, the CPDM government had many times re-
course to these judiciary and electioneering procedures to prevent ‘Anglo-
Bamis’ and Nordistes strangers from standing for election in the regions
where they were born or had lived for several decades, because their
status allegedly did not comply with the policy of belonging. On several
occasions, the CPDM regime used similar stratagems either to disqualify
the list of the opposition candidates from the electoral competition, or
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to invalidate the opposition’s victory under the pretext that it was pre-
dominantly made up of ‘allogènes’ at the expense of the ‘autochthons.’ For
example, prior to the January 1996 municipal elections, the Minister of
Territorial Administration disqualified the list of SDF candidates in 150
local government constituencies on the grounds that it did not reflect
the sociological components of the respective areas, or that the ‘natives’
were less represented in those lists than the ‘aliens’.26
Under the advanced democracy, the invention of ethnic and cultural
differences also took the form of demonization, anathemization and
pathologization of the ruling party’s opponents, notably members of the
radical opposition reunited under the banner of the SDF. Indeed, mili-
tants or leaders of this party were generally considered a bunch of ‘van-
dals’ and ‘irresponsible fellows’ who deserved no respect on the part of the
state officials. For example, Mr Kontchou Kouemegni, the former Minister
of Communication (1990-2000) had once called this political movement a
‘fascist party,’ which was indoctrinating young Cameroonians, and had
planned to plunge the country into chaos and tragedy. Twice, Ni John
Fru Ndi, the chairman of this party escaped a murder attempt by the
security forces who shot at his car and wounded the man and one of his
bodyguards. In the line of such a policy, CPDM regime’s political oppo-
nents and members of some radical Anglophone movements, such as
the South Cameroon National Council (SCNC), Free West Cameroon
Movement (FWCM) or Ambazonia Movement, which advocated the
return to the former federated states, were depicted as ‘adventurers’,
‘traitors in the enemy’s pay’, ‘power-mongers’, ‘enemies to peace,’ ‘trou-
ble-makers,’ ‘apostles of division,’ ‘secessionists’ or ‘undesirable ele-
ments’ (Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003, 2000:5-32). Likewise, extremist
members of the ruling CPDM and pro-governmental newspapers gener-
ally referred to ‘Anglo-Bami’ populations as ‘ethnofascists,’ ‘black impe-
rialists,’ ‘exploitative and unscrupulous fellows,’ ‘domineering settlers,’
‘land-grabbers,’ ‘ingrate peoples,’ ‘deceitful peoples,’ etc. They were ac-
cused of sowing disorder in the country, or of plotting to overthrow the
CPDM regime by means of ‘ghost town operation’ and SNC, as Mono
Djana (1997:23-25) stated. In the following pages, I will focus my analysis
on the second mode of governmentality that has enabled Biya regime to
cannibalize the pretty siren of democracy, or to ‘capture’ its political
opponents, who have been turned into mere ceremonial figures. This
new formula of domination took by the end of 1997 the official appella-
tion of ‘pacified democracy’ (démocratie apaisée).27
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Démocratie apaisée: The End of the Political Struggle
In December 2001, I had the opportunity to dine in a smart restaurant
in Paris with a group of Cameroonian mayors from the CPDM and SDF
parties, who were participating in a meeting on local government in the
French capital. Both the CPDM and SDF mayors, who had been put up
at a luxurious hotel at the Place de Clichy, were calling each other ‘col-
leagues’ or ‘comrades.’ Some of them even planned together to ship the
fancy cars that they had just bought into Cameroon. Their trip and daily
expenses were supported by a government institution (FEICOM), which
provides financial assistance to local councils. A couple of months ear-
lier in July, Ni John Fru Ndi, the Chairman of the former radical SDF
was the CPDM’ s special guest during the ruling party’s 2nd extraordi-
nary congress. For many participants and viewers, it was memorable to
see the man who was formerly cast in the role of the villain, seating
alongside the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, or holding a
friendly conversation with the ruling party’s Secretary General. It was
the same CPDM regime that in 1997 and 2002 helped the SDF Chair-
man to thwart his former collaborators’ plan to unseat him for ‘high
treason and collusion with the ‘enemy’ (meaning the CPDM party).28
Paul Biya’s unexpected support for his former ‘enemy’ was above all
a politically motivated action. On the one hand, his intervention in fa-
vour of the leader of the so-called radical opposition party enabled his
regime to keep up its ‘cosmetic democracy’ to use Njamnjoh’s words
(2004), since without an ‘active and responsible opposition,’ as state-
controlled media often say, the democracy made in Cameroon would
not catch fire. On the other hand, Paul Biya’s backing of an Anglophone
fellow that his regime has been promoting since 1996 as the everlasting
leader of the opposition in the country was part of his strategy to main-
tain an illusionary equilibrium of power between a dominated-
Francophone government and a pro-Anglophone opposition. This frag-
ile balance might have been undermined, if a Francophone Bamileke or
Nordiste fellow who was lusting after the chairmanship of the main op-
position party in the country, had replaced the old Anglophone leader.
Moreover, ousting Ni John Fru Ndi would have compounded the
Anglophones’ resentment against their Francophone counterparts they
often accused of marginalizing them (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997:207-
29). As one analyst commented, ‘for the Biya regime, it was a matter of
choosing the lesser of two evils: between the long-time opposant whose
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bark was worse than his bite, and especially was willing to negotiate with
the ruling CPDM regime, and embittered politicians who had a score to
settle with the same regime’.29
In many respects, the government’s surprising support for the leader
of the former radical party tied in with its policy of ‘appeasement’ which
embodied the Second Coming of the democratization process in this
country: that of the ‘advanced democracy’. This ‘pacified democracy’
moved the political struggle in this postcolonial state from the former
logics of confrontation and opposition of the early 1990s to that of col-
laboration and connivance. The ‘ghost town operation’ was over, the
SNC was postponed indefinitely, the former radical opposition had be-
come ‘responsible,’ and order and peace were restored at the expense of
the former ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘combatants.’ To paraphrase Bayart
(1993), the policy of appeasement initiated by the CPDM government in
the late 1997 dramatized the logics of reciprocity and mutuality that
now inscribes both the ruling party and its opposition within the same
episteme of belly euphemistically called government of ‘large consen-
sus‘ or ‘national reconciliation.’ Like a good father, the ‘Enlightened
Guide’ in his paternalist magnanimity, refused to banish or ostracize
anyone, not even the ‘lost sons’ who had once dishonoured him or
slammed the door of the communal house behind them. As Zacharie
Ngniman (1998:12), one of the apologists of the CPDM regime, explains,
On the 12 October 1997, Paul Biya was re-elected as President fol-
lowing his large victory (92.57 per cent of recorded votes) during the
presidential election. For many observers, there was no doubt that,
unlike the 1992 presidential election during which he only cast 39.
97 per cent of the votes, this time, he had elbowroom to govern with
his CPDM party alone. All the more reason that at that time, he
already enjoyed a comfortable majority at the National Assembly (the
Cameroonian Parliament). But he did not. In his inaugural speech,
President Paul Biya rather chose to associate all political trends to
his power. In addition to the ruling CPDM, other political parties
joined the government (UPC, UNDP, UPR). Official talks began with
the SDF, the long-standing rival, with more or less success. Despite
the divergence of opinion and some minor clashes, the trend was
irreversible. The new option signalled the end of the democratic tran-
sition and the beginning of the ‘démocratie apaisée’ in Cameroon. On
the eve of the 3rd Millennium, and with regard to what we witnessed
in the neighbouring countries, the President’s policy of appeasement
was an advantage that one had to preserve jealously (translation by
the author).
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As the above quotation shows, the ‘pacified democracy’ embodied the
shift, not only in the style of power and the CPDM regime’s mode of
governance but also in the way in which it dealt with its opposition. Un-
like the advanced democracy of the early 1990s which was predomi-
nately marked by the policy of stick, the pacified democracy of the late
1990s was rather guided by the policy of carrot towards opposition mem-
bers. It means that, if in the past years (1991-1996) boot, truncheon,
tear gas, bayonet, bullets, beatings and imprisonments were the privi-
leged means for keeping the opposition movement in check, after Octo-
ber 1997 incorporation in the state apparatuses, money and reward
became the principal instrument for domesticating the opposition. Even
though this corruptive practice was not really new, as in March 1992 the
CPDM government resorted to bribe to break up the former Coordina-
tion (a coalition of 40 opposition parties),30 it had never been as conven-
tional and prevalent as it became under the pacified democracy. In other
respects, the spirit of appeasement changed even the official representa-
tion of the hardcore opposition: its leaders were no longer considered
‘troublemakers,’ ‘apostles of division,’ ‘enemies to peace,’ but were called
‘our friends of the opposition,’ ‘challengers’ (concurrents), ‘political ad-
versaries,’ etc. Take, for example, Ni John Fru Ndi who was formerly
called all the names under the sun by state-controlled media. With the
advent of the pacified democracy, he became in the same official media’s
representation the ‘leader of the opposition’ or the ‘Chairman of the
SDF.’ Moreover, he was now invited to join state or ruling CPDM offi-
cials in their display of majesty and grandeur, while his party’s militants
were now allowed to hold their meeting or to march past the Head of
State during the National Day celebration.
However, one of the main achievements of this pacified democracy is
that it has established an entente cordiale or a whirlwind romance between
the former ‘enemies’ who have (re) discovered ‘the virtues of dialogue
and consultation,’ as Mr Achidi Achu, the former Prime Minister (1992-
1996), liked to say. Moreover, it has contributed to a fusion between the
ruling CPDM and its opposition, or their ‘reciprocal assimilation’31 in
the matrix of what some Cameroonian officials have felicitously called
‘mutual aid policy’ (‘njangui politics’)’.32 It means that both the govern-
ment and the opposition no longer view themselves as adversaries or
political opponents, but rather as partners or allies who are trying to
make the most of the accumulative opportunities provided by the
millennial democracy. In practice, this alliance operates in the form of
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share of the ‘national cake,’ or what Bayart (1993:155-179) has called
‘the resources of extraversion:’ for the greater good of the country, and
for the sake of national unity and peace, the opposition allows the ruling
CPDM party to rig the elections or to distort their results. In turn, for
the sake of national reconciliation and appeasement, its leaders are show-
ered with money and other gratifications, or are allotted a less important
position in the government or in the executive board of the National
Assembly, while some of them are appointed to some lucrative posts in
one of the state-owned companies (Mbuagbo 2002:431-38; Mbuagbo
and Akoko 2004:1-12).
Indeed, since 1997, both the Parliament and the government have
been serving as spaces, not only for mediation between the ruling CPDM
regime and its opposition but also for reconciliation between political
actors who were formerly divided by the advanced democracy. It is use-
ful to recall that since the implementation of the pacified democracy in
October 1997, both the CPDM and the SDF have been controlling the
government body of the National Assembly: the National Bureau and
the Commissions. For example, to compensate for the absence of its
main challenger in ‘the government of national union,’ the ruling party
has promoted the ‘election’ of some SDF’s Members of Parliament as
Deputy-Chairman, Secretary or Treasurer of the Parliament, or as Sec-
retary of one of the nine Commissions. As the official leader of the
opposition, the SDF Chairman receives the state allowances (Mutations,
27 September 2004). As Tenfack Ofegé, a Cameroonian journalist co-
gently writes,
Under the pretext that they are the guarantors of peace and stability
in Cameroon the CPDM operates a kleptocracy wherein 10% of the
population or less controls 90% of the resources. And under the pre-
text that they are not part of the CPDM racket, but they are the
guarantors of a democracy, the current SDF leadership sponsors a
system wherein 10% of the party’s leadership, not even the masses,
benefits from the graft with the CPDM.33
No wonder that the former whining opposants have fallen silent. To Tho-
mas Frank’s pertinent question, ‘Why Johnny can’t dissent’?.34 No doubt
the answer of many disenchanted Cameroonians would be because ‘the
full mouth is silent’ (la bouche qui parle ne mange pas), as ‘the talkative
mouth is empty’ (bouche qui parle ne mange pas).
In many respects, the njangui politics that is one of the main charac-
teristics of the pacified democracy seems to take the form of a democ-
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racy of the belly (démocratie du ventre) and a corruptive democracy, if one
acknowledges the present propensity of opposition leaders to lust after
ministerial posts, and the inclination of the ruling party to bribe its po-
litical opponents in order to calm them down. Indeed, with the newly
institutionalized pacified democracy, a new practice of politics has
emerged in Cameroon in which making politics is abridged to the art of
fending for oneself, or of ‘eating one’s portion’ (manger sa part), as the
man in the street ironically comments. Unlike the early 1990s when the
political struggle was essentially driven by the mythology of change, and
when making politics was above all a matter of changing the existing
political order or reframing the postcolonial state, that of the late 1990s
was primary prompted by the ‘need to acquire the patrimonial means of
one’s political legitimacy,’ as Chabal and Daloz (1999:37) would have
put it, or to share the spoils. Reflecting on the vegetative and primal
behaviour of many of them, one can rightly say that nowadays,
Cameroonian political actors are not far from what Bayart (1993:243)
felicitously describes as ‘glutinous enzymes motivated by the sole desire
of stuffing themselves as quickly as possible with the fruits of western
modernism’ or with international aid.
Even the vivid popular culture in Cameroon reflects this rush for spoils
in which almost all local political entrepreneurs participate today. For
example, in one of his successful sketches that is in fact a political satire
about the democratization process in Cameroon, the popular comedian
Chop-Chop derisively describes the ongoing pacified democracy as the
‘democracy for personal interests’ (démocratie du gombo ) or ‘mangecratie:’
the democracy for the mouth and the belly, as he explains. According to
him, the government and its opposition are engaged in what he calls the
‘chop-chop démocratie.’ That is why he too has created a party, which is
named ‘Chop-Chop Democratic Party,’ and his militants are called ‘chop-
chop people’. The party’s motto is: ‘I chop, you chop’ (I eat, you eat). The
main objective of the party’s leader is to get some ‘money or financial
retributions’ (chops or gombos) from the CPDM government or interna-
tional donors. In many respects, his manoeuvre consists of ranting at the
government in order to draw its attention. His overt opposition to the
ruling CPDM power is only a hidden transcript of his collusion with the
same regime. More explicitly, in public, the cunning politician passes
himself off as a radical opposant who regularly criticizes the CPDM re-
gime for keeping people in poverty and destitution. But in private, he
lives off the same government that offers him opportunities to tap into
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state-controlled resources permitting him to enjoy an easy life. The strat-
egy of the leader of the Chop-Chop Democratic Party is informed by the
fact that the prevailing pacified democracy works because there are (re-
sponsible) political opponents who legitimize it through ‘elections,’ votes
of laws in the National Assembly, or through formal institutions (Parlia-
ment, government, local council) or through actions such as critiques,
demonstrations, marches, etc. He is also aware of the fact that under the
pacified democracy, to get access to the state resources, you have to
play-act as a vehement political opponent: a turbulent opposant who shouts
angrily at the government or casts aspersions on the ruling CDPM re-
gime, is likely to be called to the government, ironically translated by
Cameroonians as a ‘big dish’ (mangeoire nationale).
One can find here a striking similarity between the Chairman of the
Chop-Chop Democratic Party and many ‘ventriloquist political oppo-
nents’ (opposants du ventre), as the popular literature in Cameroon calls
it. Their political struggle is no longer subjected to a double logic of
‘totalitarianizing and de-totalitarianizing’ (Bayart 1993:249), but rather
to a double process of collaboration and integration, as exemplified by
the note released on 27 October 2002 by the Chairman of the SDF. In
this message, the leader of this opposition party ‘directs the Secretary
General of the party to send an official letter to the Secretary General of
the CPDM to invite his party to another round of CPDM/SDF talks,
like the one they initiated in 1997/98’.35 The declared purpose of these
talks engaged in since November 1997 was ‘to seek avenues to perfect
the electoral system in Cameroon,’ as stated by the aforementioned
message. But their hidden objective aspired to consolidate the place of
the former radical party in the banquet of the pacified democracy which
today offers to all the opposants du ventre a fresh field in which to graze:
allocations of micro-projects, lucrative public contracts, highly market-
able import-export licenses, etc.
Conclusion: From Millennial to Spectral Democracy
In the early 1990s, Cameroonians, like many Africans, fantasized about
a democracy that supposedly would bring about a real change in their
country, which would at least prevent their old Enlightened Guide from
dying in power. Indeed, the millennial democracy in its messianic and
enchanting manifestations promised to put an end to the tragedy and
suffering Cameroonians in particular, and Africans at large, have been
experiencing since the so-called de-colonization process of the late 1950s
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and early 1960s. The (magical) word ‘changement’ embodied people’s
expectations of better life, justice and freedom. But in the end, the ‘Fa-
ther of the Nation’ succeeded in turning the pretty siren of democracy
into a kind of spectre which since 1991 has been traumatizing people,
except the cunning politicians who have been able to make the most of
the pacified democracy that has been preferred to democracy. The pre-
vailing mangecracy and ethnocracy which have become the dominant mani-
festations of the Cameroonian governance bear witness to the failure of a
democratization process that has changed everything in this country,
except what it was supposed to change: corruption, nepotism,
patrimonialism, favoritism, clientelism, tribalism, dictatorship, etc.
Moreover, the steady process of autocraticization and criminalization of
the Cameroonian state, like in many other African countries (Bayart et
al. 1999), instead of democratization and good-governance as predicted
by many analysts, is an unpleasant reminder that the modernist dis-
courses have failed to understand the mutations that were taking place
in Africa in the early 1990s. Once again, Africanists and social scientists
at large have let themselves be led up the garden path by the mysterious
Black continent and its people who seem to take a wicked delight in
playing a trick on them, deconstructing their theoretical constructions,
spoiling their project or shaking their certitudes and truths.
In the early 1990s, Ni John Fru Ndi and his SDF party were the incar-
nation of the millennial democracy. But today the former radical opposant
turned nouveau riche has become the icon of the opportunist politicians
who have sold the dreams of Cameroonians for change in favour of a
system which today allows ‘kleptocrats and con men to live long and
prosper,’ as Sani Aladji, the former SDF coordinator for the Centre Prov-
ince, points out.36 Both the fall of the man who formerly magnetized
many Cameroonians, and the slowing down of the former ‘people’s party’,
as Cameroonians used to call it, bear today the historical consciousness
of a general disenchantment with the mythology of change in this coun-
try. Many Cameroonians, who feel that con artist politicians have bam-
boozled them, translate today’s democracy as demoncracy, for the former
salvific democracy is now associated with tragedy, misfortune and dis-
tress, or with a horrible ‘thing’ (machin) that only exacerbates people’s
suffering, as many slum-dwellers of New Bell in Douala strongly be-
lieve. No wonder that the ‘calls on the Cameroonian people neither to
resign themselves to their frustrations and anxieties, nor loose interests
in politics, as this would be acceptance of Biya’s mockery of Cameroon
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and its people,’ like the one the SDF National Executive Committee
made in October 2002,37 only leave people impassive. No surprising too
that when, during the campaign for the presidential election of October
2004, Paul Biya (the then CPDM candidate and outgoing President)
talks of his ‘greater ambitions’ (grandes ambitions) that will magically
transform the ‘kleptocratic and felonious’ Regime du Renouveau (Bayart
et al. 1999) into a democratic one, sceptic Cameroonians disdainfully
considered them another ‘greater illusion’ (grandes illusions)’38 (Le Messager
on line 13 February 2005).
Notes
I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Sara Dorman and Edlyne
Agnuwon for helping me to edit this text. I am also grateful to Peter Pels and
the two anonymous reviewers for kindly reading and commenting on the
first draft of this work. This paper was written during my academic affilia-
tion with the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research of the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, and reflects somehow the ‘spirit’ and vitality of the ex-
traordinary group of scholars and postgraduate students to whom I am in-
tellectually indebted.
  1. Messager, no 1785, 14 November 2003:4.
  2. He finally died in power on 5 February 2005, following a heart attack.
  3. See Toulabor 1991:55-71.
  4. Their political engagement which entails, to a certain extent, their political
consciousness.
  5. See Mutations, 12 March 1999:5.
  6. This developmentalist and modernist ideology can be found in the writings
of some leading figures in political sciences such as Azarya 1994; Azarya and
Chazan 1987; Bratton 1989;  Bayart 1986;  Haberson,  Rothchild and Chazan
1994; and Fatton Jr. 1987. For a critical analysis of this western liberal policy,
see Badie 1992; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Frank 1991; Hibou 1998; and
Touraine 1992.
  7. See Ferguson 1999.
  8. By demo-cracy, I mean a legitimate or legal form of domination that politico-
administrative elites or those who have control over state resources and
international funds exert over subaltern groups. In short, this concept refers
to a form of power on people.
  9. See Hibou 1999.
10. In many African countries, National Conference, Roundtable or National
Debate offered a framework for mediations between various political actors.
See Eboussi Boulaga 1993; Nzouankeu 1993; Clark 1998.
11. See his interview with the French journalist Yves Mourousi in February 1990.
See also Mono Djana 1992.
5. Ndjio.pmd 04/12/2009, 20:05149
150 AJIA 11: 2, 2008
12. See Cameroon Tribune, 5 December 1990:3.
13. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.
14. Following the refusal of the ruling party and its president to concede the
organization of the sovereign national conference. On 21 March 1991, the
Political Bureau of this party issued a communiqué in which it expressed its
strong opposition to the sovereign national conference that was declared
sans object (groundless). On 27 July 1991, Paul Biya reiterated his refusal.
Moreover, he created a special armed force unit baptised Commandement
Opérationnel. See Sindjoun and Owona 1997:218-19.
15. In L’Express, 8 March 2004
16. See Konings 2002:179-204.
17. Even the conservative ruling CPDM regime was not indifferent to this idea
of ‘change’ for its leader claimed paternity for the introduction of ‘change’
into the country. As Paul Biya declared in a provocative speech he delivered
on 27 June 1991 at the National Assembly: ‘Do you want to change he who
brought change into the country? I maintain that the national conference is
pointless in Cameroon. Order will be maintained by all means’. Cf. Cameroon
Tribune, 4916, 1991:2-3.
18. Cf. Challenge-Hebdo, 37, 1991:4.
19. In The Messenger, 18 April 1991:4 (quoted by Konings 2002:187).
20. During these elections which were marked by massive frauds organized by
the incumbent regime, the candidate of the Union for Change, Ni John Fru
Ndi, obtained respectively 86% in the Northwest, 52% in the South-west,
68% in the West and 68% in the Littoral Provinces, while his main chal-
lenger, the outgoing president (Paul Biya) only scored 8%, 21%, 12% and
14% in these regions.
21. It is useful to underline that the new ‘democratic laws’ continue to cope
with legal systems and institutions inherited from the former authoritarian
system or copied from former colonial powers. These institutions remain
under the authority or superintendency of the Head of State. For example,
the amended 1996 Constitution has endorsed the control of the executive
power over the so-called ‘judicial power’ by which members are appointed,
transferred, dismissed, suspended by the administration.
22. For example, the alleged ‘revolutionary’ Mass Communication Law of No-
vember 1990 continues to restrict the freedom of expression through ad-
ministrative and judicial controls over newspapers or to impose censorship
through various procedures. See Nyamnjoh 1998:29-35.
23. See Cameroon Post, 27 June 1991.
24. For example, between April and November 1991 more than 500 protesters
were shot dead by the security forces, while more than 3000 were arrested
or detained without any trial. See La Messagère, 12 August 1991.
25. This was the case of Le Messager, La Nouvelle Expression, La Vision, Challenge-
Hebdo, Cameroon Today, Cameroon Post, etc., which were generally accused by
Cameroonian officials of spreading false information, incitement to violence
and hatred and outrage to the Head of State.
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26. See The Herald, 4 January 1996; L’ Expression, 23 January 1996.
27. I thank Peter Pels for suggesting this translation, even if for the CPDM’ s
ideologues, the démocratie apaisée indicates above all that Cameroon has moved
from the former democracy of riot and violence of the period of ‘ghost town
operation’ and civil disobedience to a ‘peaceful democracy’  (Ngniman
1998:12).
28. See Mutations, 28 September 2004.
29. See the article of Jean-Baptiste Sipa in Le Messager, 19 October 2002.
30. See Takougang and Krieger 1998.
31. On the fusion and reciprocal assimilation of the political elites, see Bayart
1993:150-179.
32. Receiving in 1994 a delegation of traditional leaders from his native region
(Northwest Province), who came to express their grievances to him, Simon
Achidi Achu, the then Prime Minister of Cameroon told them that they had
to support the CPDM regime, should they want the state resources to flow
towards their regions or villages. As he put it: ‘politics na njangui’ (politics is
a mutual aid); you watch my back I watch your own.’ Three years later, his
successor, Peter Mafany Musonge repeated the same principle to his village
fellows (Southwest Province) who came to congratulate him, following his
appointment as Prime Minister. As he declared, ‘by appointing one of the
sons of our soil to this important post, the President has scratched our back,
and we shall scratch the Head of State’s back when the time comes’ (Akoko
and Mbuagbo 2003:6).
33. See Postwatch, 15 September 2004:3
34. This witticism is in fact a sharp critic against the so-called counter-hegemonic
culture. See Frank 1997[1995]:31-45.
35. Cf. Resolutions of the SDF National Executive Committee on 27 October
2002.
36. See Le Messager, June 2001; Mutations, 27 September 2004.
37. See www.sdfparty.org/english/resolutions/345.php, 23 June 2005.
38. Le Messager on line (13 February 2005).
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